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Recently, Zhang, Li, and Guo have proposed a particular
eavesdropping attack [Phys. Rev. A 63, 036301 (2001)] which
shows that my quantum key distribution protocol based on
entanglement swapping [Phys. Rev. A 61, 052312 (2000)]
is insecure. However, security against this attack can be at-
tained with a simple modification. In addition, a simpler
version of the protocol using four qubits is introduced.
PACS number(s): 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
The particular eavesdropping attack proposed by
Zhang, Li, and Guo [1] shows that the protocol for quan-
tum key distribution introduced in Ref. [2] is insecure.
Here I shall describe a way to elude this eavesdropping
attack. I shall use the same notation and scenarios as in
Refs. [1,2]. In particular, by “the Bell operator” I mean
one that has eigenvectors |00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉, as defined
in [1,2].
Consider six qubits numbered 1 to 6. Alice prepares
qubits 1 and 2 in the state |00〉
12
, and qubits 3 and 5
in the state |00〉
35
. Bob, prepares qubits 4 and 6 in the
state |00〉
46
. Therefore, the initial state of the six qubits
is
|ψ〉 = |00〉
12
⊗ |00〉
35
⊗ |00〉
46
. (1)
Alice sends qubit 2 out to Bob and Bob sends qubit 6 out
to Alice using a public channel. Then Alice randomly
chooses between the following two procedures:
(i) Alice measures the Bell operator on qubits 1 and 3.
The result of this measurement will define the key. Then
Alice measures the Bell operator on qubits 5 and 6, and
publicly announces this result. Then Bob measures the
Bell operator on qubits 2 and 4. If Eve is not present, the
result of this measurement and the public result would
allow him to ascertain the key (see Table I).
(ii) Alice performs the unitary transformation
S =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
(2)
on qubit 3. This transformation changes the initial state
of qubits 3 and 5, |00〉
35
, into the state
|++〉
35
=
1√
2
(|01〉
35
+ |10〉
35
) . (3)
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Then Alice measures the Bell operator on qubits 1 and
3 (the result of this measurement will define the key),
and then she measures the Bell operator on qubits 5 and
6, and publicly announces this result. In addition, Alice
announces that she has performed the unitary transfor-
mation S on qubit 3. In this case, Bob performs the uni-
tary transformation S on qubit 4, and measures the Bell
operator on qubits 2 and 4 (again, if Eve is not present
the result of this measurement and the public result allow
him to ascertain the key; see Table I).
Now we will see that Eve’s attack suggested in [1] does
not work if Alice chooses procedure (ii). We shall use
the same numbering for the qubits as in [1]. Suppose
that Alice performs the transformation S on qubit 3, and
then measures the Bell operator on qubits 1 and 3, and
obtains the result “00.” Then, the state of qubits 2 and
5 becomes |++〉
25
. Suppose that when Eve measures the
Bell operator on qubits 6 and 8, she obtains the result
“01” (then the state of qubits 4 and 7 becomes |01〉
47
).
Then Eve performs the transformation Z on qubit 2, as
suggested in [1]. This transformation changes the initial
state of qubits 2 and 5, |++〉
25
, into the state
|−+〉
25
=
1√
2
(|00〉
25
− |11〉
25
) . (4)
Therefore, when Alice measures the Bell operator on
qubits 2 and 5, the probability of obtaining the result
“00” is 1
2
, and the probability of obtaining the result
“11” is 1
2
. Suppose Alice obtains “11.” Then, she an-
nounces this result and the fact that she has performed
the transformation S; i.e., that she has chosen the pro-
cedure (ii). Then Bob performs the transformation S on
qubit 4. This transformation changes the initial state
of qubits 4 and 7, |01〉
47
, into |−+〉
47
. Therefore, when
Bob measures the Bell operator on qubits 4 and 7, the
probability of obtaining the result “00” is 1
2
, and the
probability of obtaining the result “11” is 1
2
. Suppose
Bob obtains “00.” Then Bob infers that, if Eve is not
present, the key is “11.” However, as we have seen, the
key is “00.” Therefore, Alice and Bob will detect Eve if
they compare their two bits. In addition, once Eve knows
that Alice has chosen procedure (ii), she cannot ascertain
whether the key is “00” or “11.” Table II contains all
the possible results of Alice’s, Bob’s, and Eve’s measure-
ments for the two procedures for a particular value of the
key (“00”). It shows that Eve’s attack suggested in [1]
works if Alice chooses the procedure (i), but gives only
partial information about the key, and allows Alice and
Bob to detect Eve in half of the runs if Alice chooses the
procedure (ii).
1
There exists an attack that allows Eve to ascertain the
key without being detected in case Alice has chosen pro-
cedure (ii). This attack requires a different Bell state
measurement on qubits 6 and 8 and different unitary op-
erations on qubit 2. However, this new attack does not
allow Eve to obtain the key without being detected if
Alice chooses procedure (i). The security of the protocol
relies on Eve necessarily deciding her attack before know-
ing Alice’s choice. Assuming that Alice randomly chooses
between (i) and (ii), and that Eve randomly chooses be-
tween the two different attacks mentioned above, Eve will
be detected with a probability 1 − ( 3
4
)n
, where n is the
number of pairs of bits compared by Alice and Bob. Thus
if N bits are tested, the probability of Eve’s detection is
1− (3
4
)N/2
. Therefore, the protocol is less efficient at de-
tecting Eve than BB84 [3] or B92 [4]. On the other hand,
other interesting aspects of the original protocol such as
the fact that it delivers one key bit per transmitted bit
are retained in the new version.
So far, I have presented a modification of the protocol
[2] that avoids the attack described in Ref. [1]. My aim
has been to change the original proposal as little as pos-
sible. A simpler protocol for quantum key distribution
using entanglement swapping is as follows:
(a) Alice prepares four qubits in the state
|Ψ〉 = |00〉
12
⊗ |00〉
34
, (5)
and sends qubits 2 and 4 to Bob through an insecure
quantum channel.
(b) Alice chooses between the following procedures:
(I) doing nothing, (II) performing S on qubit 1 (which
changes |00〉
12
into |++〉
12
).
(c) Alice measures de Bell operator on qubits 1 and 3.
The result of this measurement defines the key. Then she
publicly announces the procedure she has chosen.
(d) If Alice chose (I), then Bob would measure the
Bell operator on qubits 2 and 4; if Alice chose (II), then
Bob would perform S on qubit 2 (which changes |++〉
12
into |00〉
12
), and would then measure the Bell operator
on qubits 2 and 4. In both cases, the result of the Bell
operator measurement would allow him to ascertain the
key.
In this four-qubit version of the protocol, for each of
Alice’s procedures, Eve can ascertain the key without
being detected if she performs the appropriate Bell state
measurement on qubits 2 and 4, and then gives them to
Bob in the resulting Bell state. However, as in the six-
qubit version, such attack would only work for one of the
procedures, and it could be detected in half of the runs
of the other procedure.
Both the revised protocol and the new one are secure
against a specific attack. It would be desirable to obtain
rigorous proofs of security analogous to the proofs of se-
curity of the BB84 [5–8]. Indeed, it may not be unfeasible
to obtain such proofs as a derivation of the existing ones,
since both the revised protocol and the new one have
greater similarities with the BB84.
I wish to thank Y.-S. Zhang, C.-F. Li, and G.-C. Guo
for pointing out the insecurity of the protocol [2], for
checking the modification presented here, and for sug-
gesting a way to simplify it.
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Alice Bob
Procedure Key Public Secret Inferred key
(i) 00 00 00 00
(i) 00 01 01 00
(i) 00 10 10 00
(i) 00 11 11 00
(ii) 00 00 00 00
(ii) 00 10 01 00
(ii) 00 01 10 00
(ii) 00 11 11 00
TABLE I. The columns represent, from left to right, the strategy chosen by Alice, the result of her secret measurement on
qubits 1 and 3 (the key), the result of the public measurement on qubits 5 and 6, the result of Bob’s secret measurement on
qubits 2 and 4, the result that Bob thinks is the key, in all the cases in which the key is “00,” and assuming that the initial
state is given by Eq. (1).
Alice Bob Eve
Procedure Key Public Secret Inferred key Secret Transformation Inferred key
(i) 00 00 00 00 00 I 00
(i) 00 01 01 00 01 Z 00
(i) 00 10 10 00 10 X 00
(i) 00 11 11 00 11 Y 00
(ii) 00 00 00 00 01 Z 00 or 11
(ii) 00 11 00 11 01 Z 00 or 11
(ii) 00 00 00 00 10 X 00 or 11
(ii) 00 11 00 11 10 X 00 or 11
(ii) 00 01 01 11 00 I 00 or 11
(ii) 00 10 01 00 00 I 00 or 11
(ii) 00 01 01 11 11 Y 00 or 11
(ii) 00 10 01 00 11 Y 00 or 11
(ii) 00 01 10 00 00 I 00 or 11
(ii) 00 10 10 11 00 I 00 or 11
(ii) 00 01 10 00 11 Y 00 or 11
(ii) 00 10 10 11 11 Y 00 or 11
(ii) 00 00 11 11 01 Z 00 or 11
(ii) 00 11 11 00 01 Z 00 or 11
(ii) 00 00 11 11 10 X 00 or 11
(ii) 00 11 11 00 10 X 00 or 11
TABLE II. The columns represent, from left to right, the strategy chosen by Alice, the result of her secret measurement on
qubits 1 and 3 (the key), the result of the public measurement on qubits 5 and 6 (5 and 2 in the notation of Ref. [1]), the result
of Bob’s secret measurement on qubits 2 and 4 (7 and 4 in the notation of Ref. [1]), the result that Bob thinks is the key, the
result of Eve’s measurement on qubits 6 and 8 (in the notation of Ref. [1]), the corresponding unitary transformation on qubit
2 (as described in Ref. [1]), the result that Eve thinks is the key, in all the cases in which the key is “00,” and assuming that
the initial state of Alice’s and Bob’s qubits is given by Eq. (1), and that the initial state of Eve’s qubits is |00〉
78
.
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